Abstract. In the current literature of differential games, most studies formulate optimal strategies in feedback (Markovian) equilibriums and ignore repeated interactions among players. In many real-world settings, however, the competitors' action history may have impacts on a firm's decisions. This paper considers the production strategies for several competing firms in an oligopolistic industry. A firm's profit is determined by a continuous-time stochastic demand shock process together with the production strategies of all firms in the industry. A firm's decision is only observable by other firms after an information time lag, induced by the production lead time. We study a history-dependent trigger strategy, whereby firms adopt the cooperative strategy until a firm fails to do so, and thereafter punish the deviating firm by applying the noncooperative equilibrium. We show that, as long as the information time lag is less than a threshold, the trigger strategy is both a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimum. We obtain the analytical solutions to the threshold and investigate how the threshold is affected by market growth rate, market volatility, the number of competitors in the industry, and the risk-free rate. Moreover, we investigate the repeated games in a continuous-time setting and provide a tractable approach to derive the trigger-type repeated equilibrium in a NashCournot framework. While the derivation of equilibrium strategies in a stochastic continuous-time setting can be quite challenging, we obtain a solution that is not only analytically simple but also practically applicable.
Introduction.
When repeated interactions between a firm and its competitors exist, the firm's production strategy may be influenced by its competitors' historical production strategies. In such a scenario, a repeated game should be applied in order to analyze the impact of the competitors' action history on the firm's decision making. One challenging question to management executives is: Should the firm adopt the competitive or collaborative production strategy with the competitors in the industry? Competition often brings negative externality. Noncooperative productions are likely to produce more units but achieve less profits than cooperative productions. Consequently, under certain conditions, firms may have incentives to coordinate their productions and keep such a cooperative production strategy sustainable.
In this paper we incorporate the element of repeated (history-dependent) interactions among firms in a continuous-time setting to explore the trigger strategy equilib-rium in stochastic differential games with information time lags. The continuous-time approach provides several advantages. First, it offers a much cleaner characterization of dynamic strategic production. Second, it gives an analytical analysis for the information time lag threshold. Finally, the continuous-time approach allows us to compute comparative statics and to analyze interactions among dynamics, stochasticity, risk, oligopoly, and information delay.
We examine tacit colluding oligopolies similar to the type introduced by [13] . The oligopolies obtain profits which are above competitive by the threat of punishment via moving to competitive behavior. Such a threat is sufficient to sustain cooperation by all firms. It is well known that there are usually multiple equilibria with this setting. Following [16] and [25] , we focus on the best (Pareto optimal) equilibrium the oligopoly can achieve. We assume that a firm's production decision is recognized only by other firms after an information time lag, caused by the production lead time.
Using the dynamic stochastic differential game approach, we first derive a firm's noncooperative and cooperative (Pareto optimum) production strategies in a historyindependent feedback (Markovian) game, where the firm's production decision at any time depends only on the observed market state at that time, independent of its competitors' past actions. Unfortunately, the cooperative strategy is not a Nash equilibrium for the feedback game. To sustain tacit cooperation among firms, we introduce a history-dependent trigger strategy, whereby firms keep the coordination terms (i.e., Pareto optimum) until a firm fails to do so, and thereafter punish the deviating firm by applying the noncooperative equilibrium in the feedback game. We show that, as long as the value of the information time lag is less than a threshold, the trigger strategy is both a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimum. We quantify the information time lag threshold (which determines whether firms will collude or compete) under mild conditions and investigate how the threshold is affected by key factors, such as market growth potential, demand volatility, the number of competitors in the industry, and the risk-free rate. Moreover, we investigate the repeated games in a continuous-time setting and provide a general and tractable approach to derive the repeated equilibrium in a Nash-Cournot framework. The differential game approach has played an important role in diverse fields, including economics and operations management (OM). The relevant studies in economics can be found in [13, 1, 14, 17] . In particular, repeated stochastic differential games have been studied by [18, 28, 29, 19, 7] . For example, [19] analyzes a memory (trigger) strategy in stochastic differential games for the fishery industry, using a memory state to represent whether agents cooperate or deviate. They assume that information is always available, and do not consider the impact of information delay on sustainability of the memory strategy. Dockner et al. [7, Chapter 6] provide an analysis of trigger strategies in differential games with reaction time lags and consider the conflict between workers and capitalists, but their model does not consider stochasticity and the threshold analysis for time lags.
Recently, a few applications of repeated games, which examine the sustainability of collusion in the discrete-time (i.e., supergames) context, have been reported (see, e.g., Plambeck and Taylor [22] , Taylor and Plambeck [27] , Ren et al. [24] ). However, since many models are developed in continuous-time processes, it is natural to consider differential games in a continuous-time context; see Cachon and Netessine [3] . Several researchers have studied models in a continuous-time setting (Gaimon [15] , Mukhopadhyay and Kouvelis [21] , Dockner et al. [7] , Cachon and Netessine [3] ). While significant progress has been made, a common feature of these studies is that they usually focus on Markovian equilibriums (e.g., Gaimon [15] , Mukhopadhyay and Kouvelis [21] , Prasad and Sethi [23] ), without considering the potential impact of competitors' historical behaviors on a firm's decision. Moreover, while most applications need to incorporate stochasticity, "due to the mathematical difficulties inherent in differential games, we are only aware of deterministic differential GT (game theory) models in SCM (supply chain management)"(from Cachon and Netessine [3] ). While the derivation of equilibrium strategies in a stochastic continuous-time setting can be quite challenging, we obtain a not only analytically simple but also practically applicable solution.
Our research contributes to the body of knowledge in stochastic differential games in the following ways:
1. We develop a stochastic differential game model with an application that incorporates demand uncertainty and examine the trigger strategy that takes a firm's past actions into consideration. We introduce the observation time lags pertaining to applications to gain a better understanding of how the interplay of the time lag affects a firm's production strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time in the field of differential games that the trigger strategy, stochasticity, and information delay are combined in a single model, opening a new window of opportunity for wider applications of stochastic differential games. 2. The analysis of non-Markovian Nash equilibria in stochastic differential games is challenging because the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and maximum principle for standard optimal-control problems may not be applicable for solving history-dependent problems. 1 To overcome this difficulty, we introduce affine models and the Riccatti ordinary differential equations to derive explicit solutions for a more general form in the state variables, which allow richer specifications than the current standard linear and quadratic functions. This generalization provides a new approach that can effectively deal with mathematical difficulties inherent in stochastic differential games. This research also provides some important new results:
1. In the discrete-time setting, one assumes a sequence of decisions separated by a time period interval with fixed lengths of time lags. This somewhat nonnatural assumption about time lags is not required in the continuous-time setting. We present a continuous-time model in which decisions are made continuously and the information time lag is not fixed. In fact, the length of the information time lag determines whether firms will adopt the trigger or noncooperative strategy to coordinate for a sufficiently small information delay or to compete for a sufficiently large information delay. In other words, a shorter information time lag can deter deviation for overproduction and keep coordination terms among firms, and a longer information time lag may encourage competition since it will be hard to detect and punish deviators. The current literature, including the discrete-time studies, only discusses qualitatively the impact of information delay on a firm's coordination or competition decisions. In this paper, we obtain an explicit expression of the information time lag threshold. This threshold provides management with a simple way to determine their production strategy, either reactively or proactively. In the reactive case, where firms do not have the ability to reduce information delay, their production decisions can be based on whether the current information delay is smaller than the threshold derived from our model. In the proactive case, where firms have the flexibility to reduce information delay, such as shorten the production lead time, speed up information flows among firms, or seek advance demand information, firms can take proactive actions to reduce information delay to the threshold level to enable collaboration. The profit difference between coordination and competition can be used to justify the investment costs for such proactive actions. 2. We perform a comparative static analysis on how the production strategy is affected by key market parameters. In contrast to the discrete-time setting, the continuous-time approach enables us to compute these comparative statics and provide new insights. The paper [25] conducted seminal studies of a repeated game with stochastic demand in a discrete-time model. In contrast to the stationary stochastic demand process considered in their model, our continuous-time model extends to considering dynamic stochastic processes, which allows us to explore the impacts of growth rate and volatility on dynamic and strategic production decisions. We show that a market with fast growth, high uncertainty, a small number of competitors, or a low risk-free rate leads to a larger information time lag threshold, and thus likely fosters collusion; conversely, a market with slow growth, stable market conditions, a large number of firms, and a high risk-free rate results in a smaller information time lag threshold, and thus often encourages competition. We also show that a market with fast growth, high uncertainty, a small number of competitors, or a low risk-free rate could be more sensitive to the changes of market conditions, leading to a faster variation of the information time lag threshold. Therefore, under these circumstances, firms need to be more attentive in selecting an appropriate production strategy in response to the changes in market conditions. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the noncooperative and cooperative (Pareto optimum) feedback strategies in a Markovian environment. Section 4 provides the trigger strategy in a non-Markovian setting. Section 5 illustrates the solution procedure for two examples of the price function. Section 6 discusses extensions. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. All omitted proofs are provided in the appendix. The price for a unit of output at time t, P (t), evolves over time to clear the market:
where D is an inverse demand function and X(t) represents a stochastic demand shock occurred at time t. The demand shock can refer to the relative strength of the exogenous aggregate industry demand. Conditions related to such strength of demand include household income, money supply, national economic conditions, tax policies, government expenditure, etc.
We model the demand shock process {X(t), t ≥ 0} as follows: Consider a standard Brownian motion B in R on a probability space (Ω, F , P ), with Ω as a finite set, F as a tribe of subsets of Ω, and P as a probability measure (see Duffie [8] ). We fix the standard filtration F = {F t : t ≥ 0} of B, with F t defined as the tribe generated by the union of {B(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and the null sets of Ω. The probability measure P is extended to let P (A) = 0 for any null set A ⊆ Ω. We assume that the demand shock process, X = {X(t), t ≥ 0}, is adapted to filtration F (i.e., the random variable X(t) is measurable with respect to F t ), and satisfies the stochastic differential equation
where dB(t) is the increment of a standard Brownian motion B. Parameter values μ(X) and σ(X) are assumed to satisfy usual conditions for the existence of solutions for (2.2) (see Duffie [8] and Karatzas and Shreve [20] ). As a special case, when μ(X(t)) = μX(t) and σ(X(t)) = σX(t), the demand shock process X becomes a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Brownian motions have been widely applied in finance as well as the OM literature (see, e.g., [4] , [6] , [32] , and the references therein). In this setting, given the aggregate supply C(t), the market-clearing price P (t) is set so that the aggregate demand will match the aggregate production output at time t. We assume that the price function P (t) is strictly decreasing in C(t), is strictly increasing in X(t), and satisfies a usual condition for a finite asset value, i.e.,
where r is the risk-free rate.
We assume a deterministic production lead time, denoted by L, L ≥ 0; that is, it takes a firm L time units to produce the product. Let q i = {q i (t), t ≥ 0} be a continuous sequence of production quantity decisions made by firm i. If L = 0, then q i (t) = c i (t); i.e., firm i's production quantity and production output at time t are the same; if L > 0, then q i (t) = c i (t + L); that is, firm i's production quantity at time t equals its production output at time t + L. Since q i is equivalent to c i with a time shift L, we will use q i to denote the decision path of firm i whenever possible. Let Q −i = {Q(t) − q i (t), t ≥ 0} be the aggregate production quantity profile of other firms excluding firm i, where Q(t) = n i=1 q i (t) is the aggregate production quantity of all firms at time t. Also let C −i (t) = C(t)−c i (t) denote the total production output from all firms, excluding firm i, at time t.
We assume events occur in the following chronological order. The productions of {q i (t)} start at time t and complete at time t + L. The delivery of outputs {q i (t)} to the market occurs when the production of {q i (t)} is completed and the demand shock X(t + L) is observed by firms; that is, {q i (t)} is delivered to the market at time t + L. We assume that firm i's production decision is private information until q i (t) is used to fulfill demand; that is, other firms can infer firm i's decision q i (t) by observing the market-clearing price and demand shock at its delivery time t + L. For exposition simplicity, in the basic model we assume firms are identical in terms of their production lead time.
2
Due to the time lag of the production lead time, the price at time t relies on the demand shock observed at time t and the total quantity produced at time t − L. Therefore, we can rewrite the price function (2.1) as
We assume the production cost is negligible (this assumption will be relaxed in section 5.2; also see remark 1 in section 6), thus P (t) is the cash flow per unit output at time t. We assume that a firm's profit is realized when its production output is delivered to the market. From the above expression, the profit function of firm i at time t is given by
We adopt the common definitions and notation in differential games in this paper (see, e.g., Dockner et al. [7] ). Consider a differential game with the observed demand shock trajectory X = {X(t), t ≥ 0} adapted to the standard filtration F and the production decisions q = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ), where q i = {q i (t), t ≥ 0} and q i (t) is the production quantity decision of firm i at time t. Let q(t) = (q 1 (t), q 2 (t), . . . , q n (t)). Let I i (t) be information available to firm i at time t, t ≥ 0, such as the observed demand shock trajectory up to time t, X t = {X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, and the n-tuple production output history observed by firm i up to time t. We refer to I i (t) as the information state of firm i at time t, t ≥ 0, and I = {I i (t), t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} as the information space, which is the collection of all information states across different firms over time. The specific form of the information state I i (t) will depend on the strategy deployed by each firm and will be specified in the later sections.
Let φ i denotes firm i's production strategy. At each time epoch t, φ i prescribes firm i's production decision q i (t) at time t, which subsequently determines its pro-
. . , n and t ≥ 0. Denote the n-tuple strategy profile by φ = {φ i , φ −i }, where φ −i = {φ j , j = i} denotes the strategies of other firms except firm i. The set of strategies for the game with information space I is denoted by S I . Finally, the set of feasible responses by firm i to a given (n − 1)-tuple φ −i is given by S Ii (φ −i ).
Given available information I i (t) and the production strategy profile (φ i , φ −i ), firm i's expected payoff function from time t onwards can be rewritten as, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t ≥ 0,
where, given the production strategy profile (φ i , φ −i ), the expectation E t is taken with respect to process X, conditioning on information I i (t) available at time t. Note that firm i's payoffs during the time interval [t, t + L) are not affected by its production decisions from time t onwards, so only the payoffs from time t + L onwards have been considered in (2.5).
3. Feedback strategy. In this section, we consider feedback strategies. In a feedback (Markovian) game, a firm's decision depends only on the observed market state X(t), the same for all firms. As such, we denote I i (t) = {X(t)} as the information state at time t for each firm in a feedback game. We also let I = X as the information space of the feedback game, which is the collection of all possible market states for any time t . An n-tuple feedback differential game with the initial observed market state x 0 at time t = 0, denoted by P X (x 0 , 0), is formulated in (2.2) and (2.5), with the feedback information space X . Note that for the feedback game, we need only consider the class of stationary policies; that is, the action taken at time t depends only on X(t) and is independent of time epoch t. Therefore, for any stationary strategy φ i ∈ S X , we can write q i (t) = φ i (X(t)), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the feedback game, information available to any firm i at time t is I i (t) = {X(t)}. Therefore, we can express (2.5), which gives firm i's expected payoff function with the strategy profile (
In the following two subsections, we derive the value functions of each firm under both the noncooperative and cooperative (Pareto optimum) strategies in the feedback game by solving the coupled HJB stochastic differential equations.
Noncooperative equilibrium.
The papers [11] and [12] provide sufficient conditions for the optimal solution to the SDE with a single player control. Basar and Olsder [2, Theorem 6.27] discuss a multiple player stochastic differential game. The following theorem is similar to their result, and we provide the proof in Appendix A for completeness.
Theorem 1 (Markovian Nash equilibrium). For an n-tuple nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with information space I = X , formulated in (2.2) and (3.1), the n-tuple feedback strategies {φ N * } provide a Nash equilibrium solution if there exist n suitably smooth functions J i t (X(t)), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, t ≥ 0, satisfying the system of HJB equations
where
See Basar and Olsder [2] for a sufficient Nash condition for the existence of the supremum of (3.2). Moreover, see Uchida [30] , [31] for a set of sufficient conditions and technical restrictions on π, σ, q, under which there exists a set of sufficiently smooth solutions for the HJB equation (3.2). From (2.4) and (3.2), we can determine the feedback control q N * i (t) by solving the following HJB equations:
3.2. Pareto optimum. Now consider the case in which firms make their production decisions cooperatively. The following theorem is a direct application of the result in [11] for a single player problem to our multiple player cooperative problem.
Theorem 2 (cooperative optimum). For an n-tuple nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with the feedback information space X , formulated in (2.2) and (3.1), the n-tuple feedback strategies {φ C * i } provide a Pareto optimum if there exists a suitably smooth function J C t (X(t)), satisfying the HJB equation
Due to symmetry, the payoff function of each firm is
n , and the optimal production quantity for firm i is φ
i. Therefore, the Pareto optimal solution q C * (t) can be obtained by solving the HJB equation
Furthermore, we can determine the best response feedback control q
) by solving the following HJB equation:
The cooperative strategy under a feedback game is a Pareto optimum; that is, it maximizes the joint profit of all firms. However, as we will illustrate in section 5, such a cooperative strategy may not be a Nash equilibrium for the feedback game. Indeed, given that other firms adopt the cooperative production profile φ C * −i , firm i has the incentive to produce more than what is prescribed by φ C * i . It is then important to design a cooperative strategy that retains the properties of an equilibrium and, in the meantime, is a Pareto optimum. We discuss such a game in the next section.
Trigger strategy.
In this section, we consider a history-dependent trigger strategy.
3 It is well known that under a history-independent feedback strategy, a cooperative (i.e., Pareto optimum) strategy may not be a Nash equilibrium for the feedback game. The basic idea for constructing a solution that is both a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto optimum is to design a new game with history-dependent strategies. Specifically, we develop a history-dependent trigger strategy. A trigger strategy is to keep the coordination terms until a firm fails to do so, and thereafter to punish this firm by applying the noncooperative equilibrium in the feedback game.
We define the information or detection time lag δ as the time between a firm's production decision and the time that the decision becomes known by other firms (i.e., when the firm delivers the output to the market). The information or detection time lag (we use the two terms interchangeably) is δ = L. This detection time lag will be the focus of the reminder of this paper.
We now define a trigger strategy based on the detection time lag δ. Let us denote the t-truncation of the observed demand shock process X as X t = {X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Similarly, the t-truncation of the n-tuple control paths is denoted by q t = {q 1 
The information state of firm i with information time lag δ is defined by H i (t) = {X t , q i,t , q −i,t−δ }, which is the history observed by firm i up to time t, with q −i,t = q −i,0 for t ≤ 0. Denote I = H = {H i (t), t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} as the information space for a history-dependent differential game. An n-tuple historydependent differential game P H (x 0 , 0) is formulated by (2.2) and (2.5), with
We introduce the trigger strategy profile ψ with respect to the cooperative strategy profile φ C * , which represents the Pareto optimum, and the noncooperative strategy profile φ N * , which represents the threat or punishment strategy. At any time instant t, firm i can decide whether to coordinate and continue to play the cooperative strategy φ C * i or to deviate from it. Note that if firm i defects from its cooperative strategy at time t − δ, its opponents will observe the deviation at time t. We assume that all firms will switch to the punishment strategy (i.e., the noncooperative strategy) φ
at time t when the defection is detected. We further assume that the punishment lasts forever. Under these assumptions, a trigger strategy ψ i for firm i with the cooperative strategy profile φ C * and a punishment strategy profile φ N * can be defined as follows:
, firm i hasn't defected up to time t and other firms haven't defected up to time t − δ, φ
where q
Note that the trigger strategy ψ i depends on history H i (t) only through feedback information {X(t)} and whether a defection by another firm has been detected up to time t − δ.
Denote the information space corresponding to the cooperative strategy φ
. . , n. Now consider the decision problem of firm i at time t under the assumption that all other firms use the trigger strategy profile ψ −i . If firm i continues to cooperate from time t onwards, then its discounted payoff over the remaining time horizon is
On the other hand, firm i can adopt a deviation strategy φ i ∈ S Hi starting at time t where other firms use the trigger strategy profile ψ −i ; that is,
where φ
is the best response feedback strategy given other firms' cooperative feedback strategy profile φ C * −i . We have the best response feedback control q
Denote f (X(t), δ) as the difference of firm i's payoff functions under strategies φ i and φ C * i , given that other firms use the trigger strategy ψ −i . Then
{δ(X(t))}. 
{δ (X(t))}. 
are the deterministic coefficients, independent of the information time lag δ, associated with the strategy profiles (φ
There is a wide array of profit functions satisfying conditions specified in (4.9)-(4.11), including the two examples to be considered in the next section, with both additive and multiplicative demand shock processes (see [17] for examples of additive and multiplicative demand shock processes). It can be shown that when n > 1,
Moreover, let us consider a GBM process X with parametrization
2 )t + σB(t), (4.14) where μ and σ are constant. Therefore, as the direct consequence that process X is a GBM process,
We define
i.e.,f (X(t), δ) is firm i's net gain by deviating from the cooperative strategy, scaled by e rδ−μγL . We scale function f (X(t), δ) by e rδ−μγL so that the right-hand side (RHS) of (4.16) can be expressed as a strictly increasing function of δ. To see this, we note by (2.5) and (4.3) that we can express (4.16) as
The next corollary shows thatf (X(t), δ) is a strictly increasing function of δ.
Corollary 2. Suppose the profit function satisfies conditions specified in (4.9)-(4.11). Then functionf (X(t), δ) is a strictly increasing function of δ.
The implication of Corollary 2 is thatf (X(t), δ) crosses 0 at most once as δ increases. Since bothf t (X(t) and f (X(t), δ) cross 0 for the same value of δ, it implies that the latter function crosses 0 at most once. Moreover, the two functions share the same sign (positive or negative), and thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Suppose the profit function satisfies conditions specified in (4.9)-(4.11). Let δ f (X(t)) be the solution of f (X(t), δ) = 0. Then δ f (X(t)) = δ(X(t)).
Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 can be utilized to characterize the optimal production policy. The implication is that the information time lag determines whether firms will adopt the trigger strategy or the noncooperative strategy: It is optimal to coordinate for a sufficiently small information time lag δ, whereas it is optimal to compete for a sufficiently large time lag δ. In other words, a shorter information time lag may deter deviation for overproduction and keep coordination among firms, and a longer information time lag may encourage competition since it will be hard to detect and punish deviators.
The information time lag threshold δ * developed in the paper can facilitate managerial decisions on whether to compete or coordinate with competitors. Both no information delay (δ = 0) and infinite information delay (δ = ∞) are rare in the real world. In many real situations, firms can select an appropriate production strategy by comparing the information time lag threshold with their own estimated information delay measure. Information availability increases firms' ability to deter deviation, and thus leads to tacit cooperation. Since the information delay δ = L is affected by the production delay, in order to maximize the expected profit, firms may choose to decrease the production lead time, share information of production schedules (such as setting up industrial associations or developing information systems), and reduce information search cost and time. There is evidence that firms have recognized the important role of information time lags to sustain collusion. Fudenberg and Tirole [14] suggest that industries take action to shorten detection lags. An interesting example is the reporting system adopted by the American Hardwood Manufacturer's Association. As described by [26] : "By keeping all members fully and quickly informed of what others have done, the work of the plan results in a certain uniformity of trade practices . . . , cooperative competition, not cut-throat competition."
Solution.
In this section, we introduce an affine demand model and the Riccatti ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and derive the explicit solutions to the noncooperative equilibrium, cooperative optimum, and the trigger strategy.
To motivate our solution procedure, we first discuss the feedback solution. In general, it is difficult to derive the closed-form solutions to stochastic differential games due to the second-order term. In the current literature, closed-form solutions for stochastic differential games are available for two special classes of models. In the first class of SDEs, the profit function π i is a linear function of the observed demand shock X(t); see Dockner et al. [7, Chapter 8] . The second class of SDEs is affine quadratic models in which the profit function π i is a quadratic function of X(t), and the mean drift and the volatility are affine in X(t) (see Basar and Olsder [2] and Dockner et al. [7, Chapter 8] ). In these two classes of standard models, the solutions are restricted to the linear or quadratic functions of X(t).
To relax those restrictions, in this paper we introduce an affine demand model and the Riccati ODEs to derive the explicit solutions to more general SDEs. This generalization has the potential for wider applications of stochastic differential games in different areas.
A stochastic process Z = {Z(t), t ≥ 0} is affine if
Suppose that the observed demand shock process X = {X(t), t ≥ 0} satisfies Z(t) = log(X(t)), where the stochastic process Z is affine, as defined above. We therefore call such a model an affine demand model. We consider an affine discount rate r = ρ 0 + ρ 1 · Z(t) and an exponential-affine payoff function e a+b·Z(t) . Then it can be shown [10] that 
with the boundary conditions α s (s) = a and β s (s) = b.
To illustrate applications of affine processes, let us consider X(t) η = e Z(t) for a constant η. Suppose X(t) is a GBM. Clearly {Z(t), t ≥ 0} is an affine demand process. Following Ito's lemma,
which is an affine process with K 0 = μη + 0.5η(η − 1)σ 2 , H 0 = ση, and 
for some constants κ,z, and C. It can be shown that for a given coefficient q,
(s−t)+β(s−t)Z(t) ,
where the coefficients α(s) and β(s) can be derived explicitly as follows (see [9] for a general basic affine model with an affine jump process):
For example, when q = 0, we have
This equation is similar to (4.15) in that α(T ) and β(T ) are independent of s. Therefore, similar analysis using (4.16)-(4.17) and Corollaries 2 and 3 can be applied to the CIR model as to the GBM model. This approach can also be used to obtain the explicit solutions for α and β for the Gaussian model and the basic affine model, which is a general CIR model with an affine jump process (see [8] and [9] ). The affine demand model provides rich and tractable generalizations compared to the two classes of standard stochastic differential games (linear and affine quadratic). For example, the affine demand model will provide closed-form solutions, where the parameter η need not be restricted to η = 1 (linear) or η = 2 (quadratic). For more general affine processes, numerical solutions of the ODE (5.4) are available. For example, discretization methods such as Runge-Kutta can be applied.
In the next two sections, we illustrate our solution procedure by two examples of the price function. In the first example (section 5.1), the price function is linear in terms of the demand shock; in the second example (section 5.2), the price function is a constant elasticity demand shock curve.
Linear price function.
In this section, we assume the price function takes a linear form:
where the observed demand shock process X follows a GBM 4 and satisfies the affine process.
Note that firms make production decisions based on the forecast of X(t + L) given current information X(t). For the linear price function given in (5.12), the expected profit of firm i can be written as
Next, we obtain the solutions to the noncooperative, cooperative, and trigger strategies. The noncooperative equilibrium of firm i's production quantity at time t can be expressed as (5.14) q
which results from (5.13) and the fact that due to symmetry, Q −i (t) = (n − 1)q i (t). From (5.13), firm i's expected profit at time t + L with the production output nq
whereπ
. The Pareto optimum of firm i's production can be expressed as (5.15) q
which results from (5.13), Q −i (t) = (n−1)q i (t), and that the objective is to maximum the sum of the profit of n firms. Equation (5.15) yields the expected profit at time t + L as
. Comparing (5.14) and (5.15), one sees that the production quantity under the noncooperative strategy is higher than that under the cooperative strategy. Also, the cooperative strategy yields a higher profit than the noncooperative strategy, as expected.
Finally, consider firm i's payoff function under the deviation strategy φ i . Suppose all firms except firm i choose the Pareto optimum production quantity q C * (t) given in (5.15); then by solving (3.6), we obtain firm i's best response production quantity (5.17) q
2 . Since (n + 1)
2 > 4n for n > 1, one sees π
C * (t); i.e., a deviating firm during the detection period produces more than that under the noncooperative strategy, which in turn is more than that under the cooperative strategy.
Recall that firm i's defection will be detected and punished after a detection time lag δ. Then, assuming r − 2μ − σ 2 > 0 for convergence, we have
On the other hand, suppose that firm i continues to cooperate; then its utility will be
.
We then obtain the difference function of the previous two expressions as
It can be shown that δ(X(t)), defined in (4.4), is the solution to f (X(t), δ) = 0. Then
Since δ(X(t)) is independent of X(t), according to the definition of the information time lag threshold δ * defined in (4.5), we have
Next, we discuss the impact of the information time lag on the incentives for competition and coordination. In particular, we determine how the growth drift and volatility of the demand shock process, the discount factor r, and the number of competing firms n affect the information time lag threshold, which is critical to sustain collusion. That is, we consider four potential factors that influence δ * : the mean drift μ, the volatility σ, the discount factor r, and the number of firms n. From (5.19), we have 
1. Market growth drift. First consider the effects of changes in the market growth drift on the propensity of tacit cooperation. From Table 5 .1, we find that the threshold δ * is an increasing and convex function of μ. Since μ measures the market growth rate, a larger μ implies a larger potential market. Note that an increasing μ will lead to an increasing δ * , and subsequently an increasing likelihood of δ ≤ δ * . This means that for a rapid growing market, firms prefer coordination to competition. On the other hand, a decreasing μ will lead to a decreasing δ * , so that the likelihood of δ ≤ δ * will decrease. It implies that when the future market opportunity is insignificant, firms are more likely to compete with each other. Moreover, the convexity of function δ * with respect to μ implies that a faster growing market could be more sensitive to the changes of market potential, leading to a faster variation of the information time lag threshold. Therefore, firms need to be more attentive in selecting an appropriate production strategy in a rapidly growing market; conversely, a slow growing market results in a slower change in the information time lag threshold, and thus a more stable market environment to sustain the noncooperative strategy. 2. Volatility. Let us consider the effects of market volatility on the propensity of tacit cooperation. From Table 5 .1, we find that the time lag threshold is an increasing and convex function of σ. Since σ describes the uncertainty of the market, a larger σ means that future demand is highly uncertain. As such, an increasing σ will lead to an increasing δ * and, consequently, an increasing likelihood of tacit cooperation. This means that when the market is volatile, firms prefer coordination to competition, and when the market is predictable, firms prefer competition to coordination. Moreover, the convexity of δ * with respect to σ implies that in a highly volatile market, firms are more likely to switch between the coordination and competition modes in responding to the changes in market volatility, and in a predictable market, firms are more likely to sustain one production strategy over time. 3. Discount rate. From Table 5 .1, we find that the time lag threshold is a decreasing and convex function of r. By definition, r is the risk-free capital depreciation rate for the industry. The first expression means that in a high-risk, high-return industry, firms are more likely to compete with each other. On the other hand, the convexity of δ * with respect to r implies that the optimal production strategy in a high-risk, high-return industry is more sensitive to the capital depreciation rate, and firms need to be more attentive in selecting an appropriate production strategy in response to the changes of the capital depreciation rate. 4. Number of firms. From Table 5 .1, we find that the time lag threshold is a decreasing and convex function of n. The increasing of δ * with respect to n reveals that a large number of firms in an industry increases the likelihood of competition. Therefore, an industry with many competing firms requires a faster information flow in order to coordinate production decisions. Moreover, the convexity of function δ * with respect to n(≥ 3) implies that the best production strategy for an industry with a small number of firms could be more sensitive to the entry (departure) of new (existing) competitors, which should be monitored closely.
Constant elasticity demand curve.
We now assume that the price can be expressed by a constant elasticity demand curve:
where γ > 1 to ensure that the marginal profit is an increasing function of X(t), where the observed demand shock process X follows a GBM process. We also assume a positive production variable cost c. Firm i's expected profit is given by
The information time lag threshold δ * can be derived similarly as before and details can be found in Appendix I. By checking the first-and second-order partial derivatives of δ * with respective to the mean market drift μ, the market volatility σ, and the discount rate r, we can show that δ * is an increasing convex function of μ, an increasing convex function of σ, and a decreasing convex function of r. Those results are parallel to our early findings for the linear demand shock case. Because the analytical relationship between the detection time lag threshold and the number of firms n is tedious to obtain, we resort to the numerical answer. Figure 5 .1 shows that the detection time lag threshold is a decreasing convex function of the number of firms.
Extensions.
In this section, we study several possible extensions to the original model in order to understand the scope and robustness of our results.
1. For expositional simplicity, we assume in section 5.1 that the production variable cost is zero, and the price function (5.12) is a linear function of the demand shock. Those assumptions can be relaxed by assuming a positive production variable cost c and a more general linear form of the price function:
where a > 0 and b < 0. We have obtained the solutions to the three production strategies under the relaxed assumptions. Because it is difficult to obtain the analytical solution of δ(X(t)) and δ * , we use numerical methods for their solutions. From Figure 6 .1, we can see that all the relationships between δ * and μ, σ, n, and r coincide with their counterparts in the simpler case we studied in section 5.1. 2. Our results can also be generalized to the asymmetric case, for example, when firms have different product lead times. To illustrate, consider two firms with lead times L 1 and L 2 , respectively, with all other assumptions the same as in the original model. Then the information time lags for the two firms are
Now let
Similarly to the result stated in Theorem 3, we have the following corollary. Corollary 4 (different information time lag thresholds). The trigger strategy profile ψ = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) defined in (4.1) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the game P H (x 0 , 0) if and only if δ i ≤ δ * i . The implication of Corollary 4 is that one firm's production strategy (e.g., competition or cooperation) depends on other firms' information time lag.
7. Discussion and conclusion. The stochastic differential game framework has proven to be a very useful tool in the analysis of dynamics, uncertainty, competitions, and coordinations in firms' production decisions. However, the standard framework of Markovian strategies may not be sufficient in many applications. To make optimal decisions, firms with repeated relationships have to consider their competitors' action history. In other words, the true optimal production strategy cannot be solved by ignoring the repeated interactions, but must be part of a history-dependent equilibrium. This paper provides a general and analytically tractable solution for determining the equilibrium strategies of firms in a Nash-Cournot framework.
Our generalization of the stochastic differential game with Markovian equilibriums to include history-dependent strategies provides new implications from the standard closed-loop control setting. By introducing non-Markovian strategies to a stochastic differential game model and allowing relatively rich and tractable specifications of stochastic processes and profit functions, we offer wider applications of stochastic differential games in production decisions. In addition, compared to the discrete-time model, this research presents a continuous-time model in which decisions are made continuously and the information time lag can take any real value. We develop a novel methodology that characterizes the continuous information time delay.
We suggest several future research directions. Transform analysis can be applied to the affine model for the problem where the profit functions are options of the underlying uncertainty process. Asymmetric information on costs and lead times deserves further investigation. It is also interesting to incorporate inventory and shortages in our model. One can also consider capacity, design quality, as well as pricing decisions in stochastic differential games incorporating repeated interactions and uncertainty. The authors have been working on research along some of these directions.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1. Note that each player's decision problem, given other players' strategies φ −i , can be modeled as a one-player SDE. The papers [11] and [12] show that for an SDE formulated by (2.2) and (3.1), with other players' strategies fixed at Q −i (t) = j =i φ j (X(t)), t ≥ 0, a feedback strategy for firm i is optimal if there exists a suitably smooth function J i t (X(t)) satisfying the HJB equation
Therefore, if there exist n suitably smooth functions {J i t (X(t))} that simultaneously satisfy a system of HJB equations (3.2) for all n firms, then the n-tuple feedback strategies {φ N * i } form a Nash equilibrium solution. The production quantity and payoff function of firm i are given by q t) ), respectively. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is an application of the oneplayer SDE following from [11] and [12] . In a Pareto optimization solution, the ob-jective is to maximize the sum of the n firms' expected payoffs. Under information structure F , the expected total payoff given the strategy profile φ is given by
By [11] , a feedback strategy profile φ C * ∈ S X provides an optimal control if there exists a suitably smooth function J 
where φ i is as defined by (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to show that the trigger strategy profile ψ is a Nash equilibrium, we need to show, for all H
Suppose other firms follow the trigger strategy profile ψ −i throughout. If firm i continues to use the cooperative strategy φ C * i , the punishment strategy profile is never triggered and firm i obtains the utility V t) ) for all X(t), t ≥ 0. This further implies that f (X(t), δ) ≤ 0 for all X(t), t ≥ 0. From Lemma 1, the trigger strategy ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the history-dependent game.
If δ > δ * , then from (4.4), there exists some X(t) and some t ≥ 0, such that δ > δ(X(t)), and f (X(t), δ) > 0 holds for some X(t), t ≥ 0. This further implies that f (X(t), δ) > 0 for some X(t), t ≥ 0. From Lemma 1, the trigger strategy profile ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) defined in (4.1) is not a Nash equilibrium for the history-dependent game.
Appendix E. Lemma 2.
To prove Corollary 1, we first provide Lemma 2. Lemma 2 (non-Markovian -equilibrium). The -trigger strategy profile ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ), defined in (4.6), is an -equilibrium for the game P H (x 0 , 0) if and only if, for all firms and all information paths {H C * i (t), t ≥ 0}, it holds for a given ≥ 0 that
where φ i is defined by (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 2. In order to show that the -trigger strategy profile ψ is an -equilibrium, we need to show, for all H C * i (t) and φ i ∈ S Hi (ψ −i ), it holds for a given ≥ 0 that
Suppose other firms follow the -trigger strategy profile ψ −i throughout. If firm i continues to use the cooperative strategy φ C * i , the punishment strategy profile is never triggered and firm i obtains the utility V .7), we have δ ≤ δ * ≤ δ (X(t)) for all X(t), t ≥ 0. This further implies that f (X(t), δ) ≤ for all X(t), t ≥ 0. From Lemma 2, the -trigger strategy ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ), defined by (4.6), constitutes an -equilibrium for the history-dependent game. If δ > δ * , then from (4.7), there exists some X(t) and some t ≥ 0, such that δ > δ (X(t)), and f (X(t), δ) > holds for some X(t), t ≥ 0. This further implies that f (X(t), δ) > for some X(t), t ≥ 0. From Lemma 2, the trigger strategy profile ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) defined in (4.6) is not an -equilibrium for the history-dependent game.
Appendix G. Proof of Corollary 2. We need to show that ∂f (X(t), δ)/∂δ > 0. Substituting (4.9)-(4.11) into (4.17), we obtain f (X(t), δ) where the last inequality uses (4.13).
Appendix H. Proof of comparative statics for Table 5.1. From (5.19), we * for constant elasticity demand curve. We obtain the solutions to the noncooperative, cooperative, and trigger strategies for the constant elasticity demand model. We solve (3.3) and obtain the noncooperative equilibrium of firm i's production quantity at time t and its corresponding expected profit as We also obtain the Pareto optimum of a firm's production at time t and the corresponding expected profit as
where α i , implying that the noncooperative strategy will produce more, but yield less, than the cooperative strategy, as expected.
Suppose all firms except firm i choose the cooperative optimum production q C * i (t); then firm i's best production quantity at time t is .
We then obtain the difference function as f (X(t), δ) = V 
